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Environmental problems like global climate change and stratospheric ozone depletion can only be remedied if states cooperate with one another. But sovereign states usually care only about their own interests. So states must somehow restructure the incentives to make cooperation pay. This is what treaties are meant to do.
A few treaties, such as the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, succeed. Most, however, fail to alter the state behaviour appreciably. This book develops a theory that explains both the successes and the failures. In particular, the book explains when treaties are needed, why some work better than others, and how treaty design can be improved. The best treaties strategically manipulate the incentives states have to exploit the environment, and the theory developed in this book shows how treaties can do this.
The theory integrates a number of disciplines, including economics, political science, international law, negotiation analysis, and game theory. It also offers a coherent and consistent approach. The essential assumption is that treaties be self-enforcing-that is, individually rational, collectively rational, and fair.
The book applies the theory to a number of environmental problems. It provides information on more than three hundred treaties, and analyses a number of case studies in detail. These include depletion of the ozone layer, whaling, pollution of the Rhine, acid rain, over-fishing, pollution of the oceans, and global climate change.
The essential lesson of the book is that treaties should not just tell countries what to do. Treaties must make it in the interests of countries to behave differently. That is, they must restructure the underlying game. Most importantly, they must create incentives for states to participate in a treaty and for parties to comply.
'As Scott Barrett notes in his important new book, the number of international environmental agreements has soared in recent decades, mainly because the international environmental impact of human activity has increased dramatically. Some of these agreements work effectively, while others are weak and ineffectual. Barrett's rigorous combination of game theory and environmental analysis illuminates the reasons for these successes and failures. Even more importantly, the book offers key tools for improved international environmental management in the years ahead, in an era when global wellbeing will depend critically on successful environmental statecraft.' -Jeffrey D. Sachs, Director of the Earth Institute at Columbia University and Special Advisor to U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan
1. Introduction; 2. The North Pacific Fur Seal Treaty and the Theory of International Cooperation; 3. Transnational Cooperation Dilemmas; 4. Games with Multiple Equilibria; 5. Customary Rights and Responsibilities; 6. International Environmental Agreements; 7. The Treaty Participation Game; 8. The Montreal Protocol; 9. Tipping Treaties; 10. Compliance and the Strategy of Reciprocity; 11. The Depth and Breadth of International Cooperation; 12. Trade Leakage and Trade Linkage; 13. The Side Payments Game; 14. Summary; 15. Global Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol
Barretts theory integrates a number of disiplines, including economics, negotiation analysis, and game theory, but he goes beyond exisiting literature on these topics by looking at their application to specific environmental problems...Barrett's lucidity and analysis of international environmental cooperation abd treaty-making make this book one of the most significant in its field in recent years...it should be staple reading for all international envirnomental scholars and policy makers Benjamin J Richardson, Osgoode Hall Law School This is an impressive book that should be of interest not only to those interested in the application of game theory to international relations but also to anyone interested in understanding how international cooperation can be promoted. Environmental Conservation Barrett provides a powerful theoretical framework for thinking about why some international environmental treaties succeed and others fail. Environmental Conservation Every now and again, a treatise appears that alters the way we see events. Scott Barrett's Environment and Statecraft is one such work. The book, more than a decade in preperation, is a craft of inventiveness, meticulous research, intellectual insight and surprise. Barrett's book is probably one of the most important publications in the past few decades on global environmental problems. For students of politics, economics and the environment, and for negotitators and politicians, this book is to be carried around like a Bible. If I had written it, I would retire content that I had made a real difference. David Pearce, UCL and Imperial College, London - Times Higher Education Supplement Apart from the immense coverage of past agreements, the main feature of Barrett's analysis is his use of game theory. Indeed, anyone wanting an introduction to this branch of mathematics and economics is unlikely to do better than work through the examples in this book. David Pearce, UCL and Imperial College, London - Times Higher Education Supplement Environment and Statecraft is a craft of inventiveness, meticulous research, intellectual insight and surprise. David Pearce, UCL and Imperial College, London - Times Higher Education Supplement ... the mathematical rigor that Barrett brings ought to be beneficial and challenging even to those whose research generally rejects such approaches. Political Studies Review The book is well written and accessible ... useful for those studying environmental politics. Political Studies Review As Scott Barrett notes in his important new book, the number of international environmental agreements has soared in recent decades, mainly because the international environmental impact of human activity has increased dramatically. Some of these agreements work effectively, while others are weak and ineffectual. Barrett's rigorous combination of game theory and environmental analysis illuminates the reasons for these successes and failures. Even more importantly, the book offers key tools for improved international environmental management in the years ahead, in an era when global wellbeing will depend critically on successful environmental statecraft. Jeffrey D. Sachs, Director of the Earth Institute at Columbia University and Special Advisor to U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan Contrary to many theoretical analyses, Scott Barrett presents an ingenious theory of how nation states may be able to overcome dilemmas and protect transboundary environmental resources. Any thoery that successfully helps to explain international agreements regarding biodiversity, the ozone layer, global climate as well as diverse fisheries is a powerful theory. Students of international relations as well as of environmental science will have many useful lessons to learn from a careful reading of this book. Elinor Ostrom, Co-Director, Workshop in Political Thoery and Policy Analysys, and Center for the Study of Institutions, Population and Environmental Change, Indiana University Drawing on a range of intellectual disciplines including international relations, economics, international law, and game theory as well as a sweeping review of the existing set of environmental treaties, Scott Barrett offers a series of insights on what is required for successful global-scale environmental cooperation. The book will be a significant addition to the environmental literature. Dan Esty, Director, Yale Center for Environmental Law Policy Scott Barrett has produced a readable, understandable, and successful application of elementary game theory to the incentives that determine whether international treaties succeed or fail, and to the incentives to participate and, if participating, to comply. Barrett's mastery of incentive theory makes a lot of puzzling issues clear. From fur seals to ozone to carbon dioxide he has a theoretical framework that makes impressive sense. Thomas C. Schelling, Distinguished University Professor of Economics and Public Affairs, University of Maryland
