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About this book
By making polluting expensive, market-based approaches provide polluters with incentives to clean up, rather than mandates to stop polluting. The purpose of this volume is to explore the situations where Command and Control (CAC) may not be all bad, and in fact might even have some advantages over market-based instruments (MBI).
Contents
What is CAC: R.C. Griffin and D.W. Bromley, Agricultural Runoff as a Nonpoint Externality - A Theoretical Development; Gloria E. Helfand, Standards versus Standards - The Effects of Different Pollution Restrictions; David Besanko, Performance versus Design Standards in the Regulation of Pollution. Sensibly Designed CAC: Catherine Kling, Emission Trading versus Rigid Regulations in the Control of Vehicle Emissions; David A. Dana, The New "Contractarian" Paradigm in Environmental Regulation; David L. Greene, Why CAFE worked. Monitoring Costs: Daniel H. Cole and Peter Z. Grossman, When is Command and Control Efficient? Institutions, Technology and the Comparative Efficiency of Alternative Regulatory Regimes for Environmental Protection; Wendy E. Wagner, Symposium - Innovations in Environmental Policy - The Triumph of Technology-Based Standards; Allen Blackman and Winston Harrington, The Use of Economic Incentives in Developing Countries - Lessons from International Experience with Industrial Air Pollution; Ruth Greenspan Bell and Clifford Russell, Environmental Policy for Developing Countries; Robert W. Hahn and Robert L. Axtell, Re-evaluating the Relationship Between Transferable Property Rights and Command-and-Control Regulation. Non-Uniform Conditions: Wallace E. Oates, Paul R. Portney and Albert M. McGartland, The Net Benefits of Incentive-Based Regulation - A Case Study of Environmental Standard Setting; Susan Rose-Ackerman, Effluent Charges - A Critique; Raul E. O'Ryan, Cost-Effective Policies to Improve Urban Air Quality in Santiago, Chile. Uncertainty: Martin L. Weitzman, Prices versus Quantities; Charles D. Kolstad, Thomas S. Ulen and Gary V. Johnson, Ex Post Liability for Harm versus Ex Ante Safety Regulation - Substitutes or Complements? Imperfect Competition and Information: David P. Baron, Regulation of Prices and Pollution Under Incomplete Information; David A. Malueg, Welfare Consequences of Emission Credit Trading Programs; Robert W. Hahn, Market Power and Transferable Property Rights. Non-Economic Factors - Political Economy and Philosophy: James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, Polluters' Profits and Political Response - Direct Controls versus Taxes; Philip R.P. Coelho, Polluters' Profits and Political Response - Direct Control versus Taxes - Comment; Robert S. Main and Charles W. Baird, Polluters' Profits and Political Response - Direct Control versus Taxes - Comment; Gary W. Yohe, Polluters' Profits and Political Response - Direct Control versus Taxes - Comment; James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, Polluters' Profits and Political Response - Direct Controls versus Taxes - Reply; Michael T. Maloney and Robert E. McCormick, A Positive Theory of Environmental Quality Regulation; Steven Kelman, Economists and the Environmental Muddle; Amihai Glazer and Charles Lave, Regulating by Prices and by Command; Thomas W. Merrill, Explaining Market Mechanisms.
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