Introduction. The Economic Organization of Agriculture. Reflections on the economic organization of agriculture: Traditional, modern, and transitional (M. Nerlov). The transaction cost approach to agricultural contracts (D.W. Allen, D. Lueck). Divide and conquer price discrimination in entry games with strategic buyers (R. Innes, R.J. Sexton). Establishing vertical strategic alliances: Case studies and heuristics (W.H. Howard, E. van Duren, H. McKay). Why do firms simultaneously purchase in spot and contract markets? Evidence from the United States steam coal market (F.A. Wolak). The Extent of Market Power in Agri-Food Industries. Dynamic models of oligopoly in rice and coffee export markets (L.S. Karp, J.M. Perloff). New estimates of welfare and consumer losses in U.S. food manufacturing (J.M. Connor, E.B. Peterson). Explaining the causal relationship between farm and retail prices (G.J. Holloway, T.W. Hertel). Cartel quotas under majority rule (J. Cave, S.W. Salant). Government Intervention in Agriculture. Incorporating industrial organization into agricultural trade modelling (S. McCorriston, I.M. Sheldon). Gatt agricultural policy reform: A United States perspective (G. Rausser). Trade and storage (R.W. Anderson). Environmental policies and induced innovation: The case of agriculture (D.G. Abler). Guilty until proven innocent - regulation with costly and limited enforcement (J.E. Swierzbinski).