Part 1 Optimality overall: the economic theory of public enforcement, Polinsky and Shavell; the economics of enforcing air pollution controls, Downing and Watson; firm behaviour under imperfectly enforceable pollution standards and taxes, Harford; enforcement costs and the choice of policy instruments for controlling pollution, Malik. Part 2 Elaboration of themes - the design of penalties: the structure of penalties in environmental enforcement - an economic analysis, Segerson and Tietenberg; guilty until proven innocent - regulation with costly and limited enforcement, Swierzbinski; garbage recycling, and illicit burning or dumping, Fullerton and Kinnaman. Part 3 Self-reporting discharges: self-reporting of pollution and the firm's behaviour under imperfectly enforceable regulations, Harford; self-reporting and the design of policies for regulating stochastic pollution, Malik. Part 4 Extensions of the basic template - using "ex-post" liability: firm behaviour and regulatory control of stochastic environmental wastes by probabilistic constraints, Beavis and Dobbs; uncertainty and incentives for nonpoint pollution control, Segerson. Part 5 Using the regulatory record: cooperation, deterrence, and the ecology of regulatory enforcement, Scholz; game models for structuring monitoring and enforcement systems, Russell; an integrated strategy to reduce monitoring and enforcement costs, Hentschel and Randall. Part 6 Private and voluntary approaches: optimal standards with incomplete enforcement, Vicusi and Zeckhauser; public mechanisms to support compliance to an environmental norm, Stranlund; private enforcement of federal environmental law, Naysnerski and Tietenberg. Part 7 Empirical work - describing the M&E situation in the US: monitoring and enforcement, Russell; environmental crime and punishment - legal/economic theory and empirical evidence on enforcement of federal environmental statutes. Part 8 Do monitoring and enforcement efforts make a difference?: effectiveness of the EPA's regulatory enforcement - the case of industrial effluent standards, Magat and Viscusi; environmental inspections and emissions of the pulp and paper industry in Quebec; the costs and benefits of oil spill prevention and enforcement, Cohen. Part 9 Cost and benefits of monitoring and enforcement: standard setting with incomplete enforcement revisited, Jones. Part 10 Explaining the behaviour of enforcement agencies: the revealed preferences of state EPAs - stringency, enforcement and substitution.