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About this book
About this book
This work focuses on how economics can contribute to the design, implementation and appraisal of legal systems that create the "right" incentives for environmental protection. The 16 original and specially commissioned contributions - written by some of the leading names in their field - span many of the important areas of contemporary interest and employ case-study material combined with theoretical, empirical and experimental research.
Law and economics of the environment - an overview, Anthony Heyes; Coasean bargaining in collaborative environmental policy, Jason F. Shogren and Thomas A. Rhoads; the vertical extension of environmental liability through chains of ownership, contract and supply, James Boyd and Daniel Ingberman; horizontal vicarious liability, Tracy R. Lewis and David E.M. Sappington; liability policy and toxic pollution releases, Anna Alberini and David Austin; the economics of clean up and implications for legal design, Carl V. Phillips and Richard J. Zeckhauser; environmental liability in practice - liability for cleanup of contaminated sites under superfund, Hilary Sigman; self-enforcement of environmental law, Robert Innes; the theory of penalties - "leverage" and "dealing", Winston Harrington and Anthony Heyes; criminal law as an instrument of environmental policy - theory and empirics, Mark A. Cohen; citizen suits, Chad Settle et al; law versus regulation - a political economy model of instrument choice in environmental policy, Marcel Boyer and Donatella Porrini; international harmonization of environmental law - theory with application to the European Union, Henry van Egteren and R. Todd Smith; insurability, environmental risks and the law, Howard C. Kunreuther and Paul K. Freeman; environmental damages in court - the American trader case, David J. Chapman and Michael Hanemann; protest, property rights and hazardous waste - a reassessment, Robert Cameron Mitchell and Richard T. Carson.