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Among scholars who focus on the politics of natural resources, conventional wisdom asserts that resource-scarce states have the strongest interest in securing control over resources. Counterintuitively, however, in Perils of Plenty, Jonathan N. Markowitz finds that the opposite is true. In actuality, what states make influences what they want to take. Specifically, Markowitz argues that the more economically dependent states are on resource extraction rents for income, the stronger their preferences will be to secure control over resources. He tests the theory with a set of case studies that analyze how states reacted to the 2007 exogenous climate shock that exposed energy resources in the Arctic. Given the dangerous potential for conflict escalation in the Middle East and the South China Sea and the continued shrinkage of the polar ice cap, Perils of Plenty speaks to a genuinely important development in world politics that will have implications for understanding the political effects of climate change for many years to come.
Chapter 1: Introduction
Chapter 2: A Theory of State Preferences and Resource Competition
Chapter 3: Research Design: The Arctic as a Natural Laboratory
Chapter 4: Descriptive Statistics and Cross: National Comparisons of Arctic Power Projection
Chapter 5: Russia the Rent-Seeking Revisionist
Chapter 6: The United States' Arctic Foreign Policy: The Big Dog That Does Not Bark
Chapter 7: Canada: The Dog that Barks but Does Not Bite
Chapter 8: A Tale of Two Nordic Powers
Chapter 9: Conclusion
Perils of Plenty Appendix
Jonathan N. Markowitz is Assistant Professor in the International Relations and Political Science Department at the University of Southern California, where he is also a Co-Founder and Co-PI of both the Security and Political Economy Lab and East Grand Strategy Program. His research focuses on how economics shape what foreign goals states adopt and whether they pursue those interests by investing in projecting military power. He has published broadly on issues related to the political economy of security including power projection, grand strategy, great power conflict, the political implications of climate change, and resource competition. His work has been published in International Studies Quarterly, The Journal of Peace Research, and Journal of Conflict Resolution, among other journals.