Designing Institutions for Environmental and Resource Management

About this book

This text addresses environmental and resource management problems that continue to emerge despite increasing attempts at regulation. It proposes a proactive approach to environmental and resource management through the design of institutions and organizations. In addition, it suggests that social rules for environmental management can be improved by taking into account the social costs of externalities and the administrative and transactions costs to reduce them.

Contents

Introduction: social design for environmental and resource management, Edna T. Loehman and D. Marc Kilgour. Part 1 Concepts for institutional and organizational design: issues in the design of mechanisms and institutions, Leonid Hurwicz; on co-ordination, externalities and organization, Stanley Reiter; the institutional analysis and development approach, Elinor Ostrom; solving collective action problems fairly - puzzles in policy design, Norman Frolich and Joe Oppenheimer; heterogeneity and common pool resource management, Edella Schlager and William Blomquist; environmental change, institutions and human capital, Mark D. Agee and Thomas D. Crocker; suboptimality and transaction costs on the commons, David Feeny; designing institutions for sustainability, Vernon W. Ruttan. Part 2 Quantitative models in institutional design: pollution regulation in a political economy, Kai-Li Chen et al; co-operation in pollution reduction - design of a policy instrument, Edna T. Loehman; citizen lawsuits and the SLAPP in US water disputes, Kyung Hwan Baik and Jason F. Shogren; environmental standards and liability with limited assets and private information, Robert Innes; efficient enforcement systems for water regulations, D. Marc Kilgour; joint implementation agreements and principal-agent contracts, Elizabeth A. Wilman; contract design for public lands grazing, Jeffrey T. LaFrance and Myles J. Watts. Part 4 Experimental methods in institutional design: the scope for laboratory experiments on marketable pollution permits, Mark Isaac; instrument choice for emissions permit trading - designing a laboratory environment, Stuart Mestelman and R. Andrew Muller; comparing groundwater institutions - models and experiments, Michael R. Moore et al; resource dilemmas under uncertainty - testing Nash behaviour, Ramzi Suleiman et al.

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