Trans-boundary water resources are often a cause of conflict among riparian entities. Increasing demand for water resources and deterioration of existing water sources underscore the need to resolve conflicts over the allocation of consumption and pollution rights among conflicting uses and users. Because economic growth of the entities that share a water resource depends on sustainability of the resource, water has great potential as a basis for cooperation among political entities. However, enforcement of cooperation particularly in international settings is limited. Thus, parties sharing a water resource will form and remain in a cooperating coalition only when economic incentives for each can be identified. This book offers an economic approach to resolution of conflicts by identifying economic mechanisms that encourage sustainable cooperation.
The book includes discussions on international, interstate, and intrastate disputes regarding both water quantity and water quality issues. It presents mechanisms for facilitating cooperation among users from agricultural, industrial, domestic, and environmental sectors. It considers the experience and potential in many regions around the world including Australia (the Muray-Darling Basin), Latin America (Chile), the Middle East (Israel and the Palestinian Authority), the U.S. (California, Florida's Everglades, Hawaii, and the Chesapeake Bay), and Africa (South Africa, Lesotho).
Part I of the book discusses international experience in forming water coalitions and offers an illustrative model of water quality coalitions. It emphasizes the dependence of sustainability of international agreements on the practical ability to create incentives through economic mechanisms and political linkages that overcome the problem of limited enforcement due to sovereignty claims.
Part II of the book discusses management of intrastate U.S. water resources involving competing local jurisdictions or user groups and the U.S. and Australian attempts to facilitate state management of interstate water resources through federal cooperation.
Part III of the book explores the expanding scope of trans-boundary water resource issues that contribute to complexity of conflict beyond traditional interests such as allocation and navigation rights. In particular, it analyzes the economic implications of nutrient, land, and airshed management in an environment where the interaction of trans-boundary water resources with the ecological system is considered. Trans-boundary water usage and infrastructure are discussed in the context of privatization and political uncertainty.
Part IV of the book examines economic solutions to trans-boundary water allocation including water markets, tradable water permits, contractual arrangements, and coordinated management. The interaction between ground and surface water and the interaction between desalinated, recycled, and fresh water is analyzed in the context of optimal water allocation.
The book concludes with a critical discussion of the role and potential of the economics profession in contributing to conflict resolution and management of trans-boundary water resources. The strengths and weaknesses of economic analysis are discussed with special consideration of the modern tools of bargaining theory and game theory that go beyond economic efficiency in considering political realities.
Preface. I: International Trans-Boundary Water: Cooperation with Limited Enforcement. International Water Resource Conflicts: Experience and Potential; R.E. Just, S. Netanyahu. Potential for Sustainability and Self-Enforcement of Trans-Boundary Water Agreements; G. Frisvold, D. Schimmelpfennig. Bargaining over Shared Aquifers: The Case of Israel and the Palestinians; S. Netanyahu, et al. Facilitating International Agreements through an Interconnected Game Approach: The Case of River Basins; L. Bennett, et al. II: Domestic Trans-Boundary Water Conflict and Cooperation. Internal Water Disputes: Causes and Solutions; D. Zilberman, D. Parker. Evolving Legal and Institutional Responses to Inter-Jurisdictional Water Management Issues in the U.S.; R. Wayland, C. Lewicki. Dealing with Interstate Water Issues: The Federal Interstate Compact Experience; R. Cairo. Sharing the Waters of the Murray-Darling Basin: Cooperative Federalism under Test in Australia; J.J. Pigram, W.F. Musgrave. III: The Expanding Scope of Trans-Boundary Water Problems. Inter-Jurisdictional Water Quality Management: Experiences from Chesapeake Bay Nutrient Management; K. McConnell, I. Strand. Land-Use Patterns and Water Quality: The Effect of Differential Land Management Controls; N. Bockstael, K. Bell. Estimating Economic and Environmental Benefits of Water Markets in a Spatially Diverse Setting; S. Burke, et al. Trans-Boundary Airshed Management as an Approach to Trans-Boundary Water Cooperation: The Case of the Chesapeake Bay; D.H. Austin, et al. Ecosystems and Social Conflict: Lessons from the Florida Everglades; W. Milon, et al. Privatization and Regulation of Multi-Source Water Usage; E. Brill, et al. Noncooperative and Cooperative Management of an Accumulative Water Pollutant; E. Lichtenberg, L. Olson. Trans-Boundary Water Projects and Political Uncertainty; Y. Tsur, A. Zemel. IV: Economic Issues in Trans-Boundary Water Allocation. The Performance of Water Markets: Transaction Costs, Interjurisdictional Barriers and Institutional Options; K.W. Easter, et al. Overcoming the Introspective Legacy of Tradeable Water Entitlement Policies in South Eastern Australia; H. Bjornlund, J. McKay. Optimal Allocation of Ground and Surface Water in Oahu: Water Wars in Paradise; J. Moncur, et al. The Efficient Sharing of an Uncertain Natural Resource: A Contract Theory Approach; R. Barrett. Bilateral Water Policy Coordination under Uncertainty; S. Netanyahu. Trans-Boundary Water Allocation between Israel and the Gaza Strip: Desalination, Recycling and Fresh Water; E. Brill, et al. V: Potential Contributions of Economic Analysis to Trans-Boundary Water Cooperation. Resolving Trans-Boundary Water Disputes: Economists' Influence on Policy Choices in the United States; D. Sunding. Using Bargaining Theory and Economic Analysis as an Aid to Trans-Boundary Water Cooperation; R.E. Just, et al.