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About this book
About this book
Industrial and environmental accidents are seldom far from the headlines in any part of the globe. Yet what factors determine their occurrence and is there a pattern to their distribution?
This book brings these key questions into focus by examining three critical aspects of the topic: the belief formation vis-a-vis risk or misconduct; the design of legal sanctions; and the effects of risk regulation and liability rules on business and on the supply of finance.
The book as a whole offers real insights into the institutional and incentive constraints faced by the major players involved in the public and private management of industrial and environmental risk.
Introduction; Basic Principles of Risk Regulation, Beliefs and Awareness; The case for a procedural version of the precautionary principle erring on the side of environmental preservation, A. Arcuri; Informational regulation of industrial safety- an examination of the US Local Emergency Planning Committee, N. De Marcellis-Warin, I. Peignier and B. Sinclair-Desgagne; Regulating an agent with different beliefs, F. Salanie and N. Treich; Using information from insiders to target environmental enforcement, A. Heyes and C. Liston-Heyes; Environmental protection, consumer awareness, product characteristics, and market power, M. Boyer, P. Mahenc and M. Moreaux; Advances in Legal Design: Optimal punishment for repeat offenders when the government can and cannot commit to sanctions, W. Emons; Nash implementable liability rules for judgement-proof injurers, P. Gonzales; A tort for risk and endogenous bankruptcy, T. J. Miceli and K. Segerson; Liability Regimes and their Consequences on Private Contracting; Environmental risk regulation and liability under adverse selection and moral hazard, Y. Hiriart and D. Martimort; Judgement-proofness and extended liability in the presence of adverse selection, D. Balkenborg; Environmental regulation of livestock production contracts, P. Bontems, P. Dubois and T. Vukina; Environmental risks; Should banks be liable, K. Gobert and M. Poitevin; Sharing liability between banks and firms: the case of industrial safety risk, M. Boyer and D. Porrini; Index.
Marcel Boyer (Ph.D. in economics, Carnegie-Mellon University) is Bell Canada Professor of Industrial Economics at the University of Montreal, Howe Scholar in Economic Policy at the Canada Howe Institute, and Fellow of CIRANO (Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en analyse des organisations) and CIREQ (Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en economie quantitative). He has been awarded numerous prizes for excellence in research and is the author of over 175 articles, public reports and scientific papers. Yoland Hiriart and David Martimort are both Researchers at the Universite des Sciences Sociales Toulouse in France.